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WHOSE  LINE  IS  IT  ANYWAY?  PROBABLE  CAUSE
AND  HISTORICAL  CELL  SITE  DATA
Megan L. McKeown*
“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.  What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”
—Justice Potter Stewart1
INTRODUCTION
In most contexts, the Supreme Court has treated warrantless searches as
presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.2  A prosecutor
can rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the search or seizure was
reasonable, meaning the state bears the burden of validating the warrantless
search under one of the narrowly defined warrant requirement exceptions.3
While a warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable,4 the
Fourth Amendment’s protection has not been extended to require a warrant
to obtain a cell phone’s location information.  Privacy scholars have argued
considerably over what showing the government must make in order to
require cell phone providers to turn over the cell phone location informa-
tion data they store.5
During the summer of 2014, the Eleventh Circuit split with the Fifth and
Third Circuits on whether the government must show probable cause to
retrieve historic cell site data from cell phone providers in order to confirm
that a suspect was close to where a crime was committed.  The Fifth and
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2016; B.A., Communication and Political
Science, Mississippi State University, 2013.  This Note is dedicated to my family for
encouraging me and supporting me all my life.  I am grateful to Professor Patricia Bellia
for her guidance and suggestions throughout the writing process and to the Notre Dame
Law Review staff for their thoughtful edits.
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (citations omitted).
2 See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 112 (2014).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See Cynthia Anderson, The Privacy Debate: Does Obtaining Historic CSLI Require a Search




\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL510.txt unknown Seq: 2 10-JUL-15 12:55
2040 notre dame law review [vol. 90:5
Third Circuits have held that probable cause is not required to retrieve such
information, but the Eleventh Circuit held the opposite in United States v.
Davis.6  Some commentators have suggested this was a questionable interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment.7  Historical cell site data is retrieved from a
process whereby the cell phone communicates with the service towers
nearby, and the process continues so long as the phone is powered on.8  As
the cell phone user moves away from one tower and approaches another, the
phone will re-register at the closer tower.9  Monitoring these tower switches
can “map the movements of particular cell phones, and, consequently, their
users.”10
Following the decisions in the courts of appeals, a unanimous Supreme
Court held in Riley v. California11 that the Fourth Amendment protects the
contents of a cell phone from seizure without probable cause.12  But Riley does
not adequately resolve the issue of historical cell site data retrieval because
obtaining the contents of a cell phone is distinct from knowing the phone’s
physical locations.13  Even though the Riley decision does not reconcile the
6 See generally United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from retrieval of cell phone location informa-
tion), vacated and en banc reh’g granted, No. 12-12928, 2014 WL 4358411 (11th Cir. Sept. 4,
2014); see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding that orders to obtain historical cell site information for specified cell phones at
the points where the user places and terminates a call are not categorically unconstitu-
tional); In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the Stored Communica-
tions Act does not contain any language that requires the government to show probable
cause to get a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for cell site information).
7 See generally Orin Kerr, The Eleventh Circuit’s Novel Approach to the Fourth Amendment in
the Davis Case, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/19/the-eleventh-circuits-novel-approach-to-the-
fourth-amendment-in-the-davis-case/ (“The more I think about Davis, the more radical a
reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment it seems to be.”).
8 See Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Infor-
mation: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1747
(2009).  A request from the government for historical cell site data is distinct from a
request for prospective information when law enforcement wishes to obtain the informa-
tion “as it happens in real time.” Id. at 1747–48 (quoting another source) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  This Note will concentrate on historical, rather than real-time, cell
site data, as the consensus among courts is that the government must show probable cause
in order to obtain real-time information. See id.
9 Id. at 1753.
10 Id.
11 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
12 Id. (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
13 See generally United States v. Guerrero, No. 13-50376, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17584,
at *16–17 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2014) (“Although the issues in Riley and in Historical Cell Site
implicate a broader theme concerning the application of the Fourth Amendment to mod-
ern technology, they involve distinct doctrinal areas.”). Riley did not address the constitu-
tionality of using § 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act to obtain historical cell site
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circuit split directly, it appears at least to support the Eleventh Circuit’s effort
to exclude cell phone data obtained without a warrant.  Notwithstanding
Riley, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its decision in September 2014 and has
decided to rehear United States v. Davis en banc, revealing the importance
and controversial nature of this issue.14  The Fourth Circuit will consider the
same issue on appeal after the district court’s decision in United States v. Gra-
ham,15 in which the lower court held that information voluntarily disclosed to
a third party, i.e., the cell phone company, ceases to enjoy Fourth Amend-
ment protection.  This theory of disclosure to third parties is known as the
third-party doctrine.16  The third-party doctrine takes the view that under the
Fourth Amendment, an individual “assume[s] the risk” that information will
be disclosed to law enforcement when a person conveys that information to
the third party.17
While the view of the Fifth and Third Circuits is still the majority rule, it
is an open question whether improvements in technology have caused the
public’s understanding of a reasonable expectation of privacy to evolve.
Although some judges may not favor allowing the retrieval of cell phone loca-
tion information without probable cause, their hands may be tied by the law
as it stands, unless Congress is moved to act.
The Fourth Amendment’s plain language, which protects “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures,”18 arguably does not address all techno-
logical changes, including electronic communications (as electronic commu-
nications are not “houses,” “papers,” or “effects”).  The drafters of the
Amendment could not have anticipated such advances in electronic commu-
nication.  The statute at issue in the historical cell site data cases, the Stored
Communications Act (SCA),19 has made it difficult for district courts to find
that probable cause is required for information retrieval in the electronic
context.20  To obtain an order, the SCA only requires that
the governmental entity offer[ ] specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or elec-
data from cell phone providers. See United States v. Mack, No. 3:13-cr-00054, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 159686, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2014) (noting the lack of controlling
Supreme Court or Second Circuit caselaw addressing the constitutionality of § 2703(d)).
14 See Anderson, supra note 5 (noting that cell phone searches with respect to citizens’
privacy rights has been a “hot topic” in the United States).
15 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012).
16 Reihan Salam, The Third-Party Doctrine, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 12, 2013), http://
www.nationalreview.com/agenda/350896/third-party-doctrine-reihan-salam.
17 Id. (quoting Julian Sanchez).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment continues, “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id.
19 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).
20 See generally Anderson, supra note 5.
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tronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are rele-
vant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.21
The “specific and articulable facts” standard is accepted as a lower
threshold than the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment to
obtain a warrant,22 and challenges have been raised as to both the applicabil-
ity of the statute to historical cell site location data and its constitutionality
under the Fourth Amendment.23
Cell phones are unique in that they can offer an abundance of informa-
tion about a person.  As the Court recognized in Riley, a cell phone collects
together “many distinct types of information . . . that reveal much more in
combination than any isolated record,” and the “phone’s capacity allows even
just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible.”24
All of the information that cell phones pull together can allow one’s private
life to be reconstructed.25  For example, the historical information from cell
phone towers can be used to locate a person’s position within several feet.26
21 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).  The SCA was enacted in 1986 as Title II of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, and its constitutionality has been called into question
in a few cases.  The Fifth Circuit held in In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell
Site Data (In re Historical Cell Site Data) that court orders under the SCA to compel cell
phone providers to release historical cell site information are not per se unconstitutional.
724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).  In another case, the SCA was questioned after the govern-
ment sought to retrieve the contents of email communications, rather than historical cell
site location information.  Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2007),
vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp.
2d 384, 405 n.16 (citing Warshak, 490 F.3d at 460).
22 See In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that “the legislative history
[of § 2703(d)] provides ample support for the proposition that the standard is . . . less
stringent than probable cause”).  An order under § 2703(d) may be issued by a federal
magistrate, district court, or an equivalent state court judge, and if the issuing judge is a
federal judge, the judge does not have to sit in the district in which the information is
stored. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 130–31 (3d ed. 2009).  The statute is silent as to whether state courts have
such authority. Id. at 132.
23 See Anderson, supra note 5.
24 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–90 (2014) (“[I]t is no exaggeration to say
that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their
person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the
intimate.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 403, 405 (2013) (“Much of the information stored in a person’s cellular
phone is deeply personal.  The information can include photographs, text messages, e-
mails, personal notes, records of visited websites, and many other kinds of personal
information.”).
25 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
26 See generally Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and
the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2012); see also
Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1747 (noting that historical cell site data “can provide a
relatively detailed picture of those users’ geographic whereabouts”).  As discussed later in
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This Note argues that the “specific and articulable facts” standard does
not accord with the intent of the drafters of the Fourth Amendment to pro-
tect individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy.27  Although allowing the
government access to historical cell site data to use as evidence in a criminal
proceeding aids law enforcement, legislators must recognize the risks that
flow from allowing the government to retrieve cell phone location informa-
tion without probable cause.  At least one study suggests that the public is
losing confidence in their ability to control personal information, ultimately
creating public discomfort with and suspicion of government surveillance.28
If Congress declines to amend the statute, the idea of a “big brother” govern-
ment watching its people may disturb the sensibilities of the public.29  In
2012, cell phone providers responded to over 1.1 million federal, state, and
local law enforcement requests for cell phone records,30 with the public
largely remaining unaware of the volume of these requests.
Part I presents the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
regarding this issue, while Part II highlights the analytical problems the cir-
cuit courts have faced in attempting to reconcile Supreme Court decisions in
order to decide historical cell site data cases.  Finally, Part III presents poten-
tial resolutions of the proper standard for historical cell site data retrieval
and urges Congress to reexamine the SCA’s “specific and articulable facts”
standard to better comport with society’s privacy expectations.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Early Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s original Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
heavily tied to common-law trespass.  In Olmstead v. United States,31 the Court
held that attaching wiretaps to telephone wires on public streets was not a
Fourth Amendment search because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or
this Note, the actual precision of historical cell site data is debated, as it depends on the
number of towers in a given area.
27 For a discussion on the historical record regarding the framing of the Fourth
Amendment, see generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and
the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979 (2011).
28 See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
29 Justice Sotomayor noted the potential problems arising from the government watch-
ing the public in her concurrence in United States v. Jones: “Awareness that the Government
may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.  And the Government’s
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to
abuse.”  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); cf.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (“The prospect of unregulated governmental
monitoring will undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide.”)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
30 Joe Palazzolo, Appeals Court Will Reconsider Ruling on Cellphone Tracking, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Sept. 4, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/09/04/appeals-court-will-
reconsider-ruling-on-cellphone-tracking/.
31 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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offices of the defendants.”32  The Supreme Court moved away from this
exclusively property-based approach in Katz v. United States33 when it held
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”34  In Katz, the
attachment of an eavesdropping device to a public telephone booth in order
to listen to and record the defendant’s words was found to be a search and
seizure within the Fourth Amendment.35
Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence developed an influential two-pronged
test to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection.  First, a
person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,”
and second, society must consider the expectation to be “reasonable.”36
However, courts have since largely ignored, or at least deemphasized, the
first prong and instead have given more weight to the second prong.37
Even though Katz held that a telephone conversation from a public tele-
phone is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court has not
extended that Fourth Amendment protection to telephone numbers, even
when dialed from an individual’s private phone.38  In 1979, the Court held in
Smith v. Maryland39 that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily turned over to a third party.  There, police installed a
pen register without a warrant in order to determine the identity of a person
who had made threatening phone calls to a robbery victim, claiming that he
was the one who robbed her.40  The Court found no legitimate expectation
of privacy regarding numbers dialed on a phone, as the numbers were
turned over to a third party, the telephone company.41  The Court further
found that even if the defendant harbored a subjective expectation that the
32 Id. at 464.
33 389 U.S. 347 (1967), superseded by statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
34 Id. at 351.
35 Id. at 347.
36 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(c) (5th ed. 2014) (noting that
“little attention has been given to the independent significance of the first factor or to
precisely how it is to be interpreted”); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950
(2012) (“Our later cases have applied the analysis . . . which said that a violation occurs
when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (quoting
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring))).
38 Jacob T. Whitt, Note, Cell Phones as an Eye of the Government: In re Application of the
United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 88 TUL. L. REV. 831, 832 (2014).
39 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
40 Id. at 737.  A pen register is an apparatus a telephone company can use to automati-
cally record outgoing numbers dialed from a particular phone line, as well as the numbers
of incoming calls.  John Applegate & Amy Grossman, Pen Registers After Smith v. Maryland,
15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 753, 753 (1980).
41 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.” (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976))).
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numbers would remain private, society was not prepared to recognize that
expectation as “reasonable,” because when the defendant conveyed the
numerical information to the telephone company in the normal course of
business, he assumed the risk that the information may be turned over to law
enforcement.42  Therefore, the Court held that installing the pen register
without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.43
B. Jones: A Return to Common-Law Trespass
In United States v. Jones, the Court returned to the common-law trespas-
sory analysis of the Fourth Amendment and noted that Justice Harlan’s rea-
sonable-expectation-of-privacy test in Katz, which protects persons and their
private conversations, was not “intended to withdraw any of the protection
which the Amendment extends to the home.”44 Jones involved a defendant
who the government suspected was involved in drug trafficking; the govern-
ment obtained a search warrant to install a GPS tracking device on the bot-
tom of the defendant’s wife’s car.45  Government agents installed the device
while the car was parked in a public parking lot eleven days after the warrant
issued, even though the warrant authorized installation within ten days.46
The government tracked the movement of the car for twenty-eight days fol-
lowing installation.  The district court only excluded data obtained while the
car was parked at the Joneses’ home, while admitting the remainder of the
evidence under United States v. Knotts.47  That case48 held that a “person trav-
42 Id. at 745–46.
43 Id.
44 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (quoting Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969)).
45 Id. at 948.  Although the vehicle was registered to the wife, the defendant was the
“exclusive driver” of the vehicle; the Court declined to consider the significance of the
vehicle’s registration status. Id. at 949 n.2.
46 Id. at 948.
47 Id.
48 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). Knotts involved a challenge to the use
of an electronic tracking device or “beeper” that was concealed in a container of chloro-
form. ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: LAW AND PRACTICE 249 (9th ed.
2014).  The beeper was already inside the container when the man suspected of manufac-
turing controlled substances purchased the chloroform from the chemical manufacturer.
Id.  Law enforcement tracked the movements of the container to a location in or near
Knotts’s secluded cabin, and with that information the state narcotics agents were able to
secure a search warrant to search the suspect’s drug laboratory. Id.  In that case, the Court
found that no Fourth Amendment concern was implicated because the drug manufactur-
ers had no reasonable expectation of privacy while the vehicles were in plain view on the
public highway. Id.  According to the Court, the location of the container had been volun-
tarily conveyed to the public, but the court left open the question of monitoring vehicles in
private places. Id.
In a subsequent “beeper” case decided one year later, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984), the Court held that the installation of a beeper in a container, when consent of
the original owner of the container was obtained and the container was then sold to a
buyer who was unaware of the beeper’s presence, was not a search or seizure protected by
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eling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”49
However, because the Supreme Court found that a vehicle is an “effect”
under the Fourth Amendment, it held that the government’s installation of
the device on the vehicle and its subsequent use of the device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements was a “search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment.50
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia focused on the physical occupation of
private property for obtaining information to explain the Court’s decision,
but noted that trespass is not the exclusive test for Fourth Amendment
searches; rather, “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”51  As the Court
has not departed from its precedent establishing that visual observation is
constitutionally permissible,52 Justice Scalia left open the question of
whether electronic surveillance without a trespass could be an unconstitu-
tional invasion of privacy.53
Justices Sotomayor and Alito, however, recognized in their respective
concurrences in Jones the broader issue that physical intrusions are not neces-
sary for most forms of surveillance, and therefore, that the Fourth Amend-
ment is concerned with more than trespassory intrusions on property.54
Justice Sotomayor suggested that the idea that an individual has no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties
may need reconsideration because it is “ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third par-
ties.”55  The better question, she wrote, would be “whether people reasonably
the Fourth Amendment. Id.  In that case, the beeper was used to track the container to
several places, including private residences. See DEL CARMEN, supra, at 249.  Because the
government’s contact with the container occurred prior to transfer to the defendant, the
majority concluded that the installation of the beeper did not amount to a search or
seizure; rather, the defendant “accepted the container as it came to him, beeper and all”
and could not therefore object to its presence. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (discussing Karo).
However, the Karo Court did find that the government’s use of a beeper to track consti-
tuted a search to the extent that that it revealed information about the interior of a private
residence. See Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1763 n.115.
49 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
50 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
51 Id. at 953.
52 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001).
53 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54.  However, Justice Scalia remarked in a footnote that the
majority’s theory of the Fourth Amendment is not that a technical trespass is required. Id.
at 953 n.8.
54 Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
55 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  Instead, Justice Sotomayor indicated that it
should not be assumed that information voluntarily disclosed to any member of the public
automatically forfeits Fourth Amendment protection. Id.  Justice Sotomayor cited Justice
Marshall’s dissent in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
in which he wrote that “[p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not
at all.” Id.
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expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the [g]overnment to ascertain, more or less at will, their political
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”56
Justice Alito also argued for an analysis that would better keep pace with
present-day Fourth Amendment concerns regarding uses of new technolo-
gies.  In his view, Jones should have been analyzed by asking “whether respon-
dent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term
monitoring” of the vehicle’s movements.57  Of course, this framework would
leave some uncertainty as to whether a certain period of time for surveillance
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search—as “long-term monitoring” has
never been defined.  However, as Justice Alito argued, in the case of uncer-
tainty, authorities may always seek a warrant by showing probable cause.58
He specifically alluded to the issue of privacy in the cell phone context,
where smart phones equipped with GPS technologies permit carriers to track
and record users’ locations; he suggested that the best solution to privacy in
this context may come from Congress, which is better suited to create bright
line rules.59
C. Riley: Protecting Cell Phone Contents from Warrantless Searches
In the recent decision of Riley v. California,60 the Supreme Court
addressed privacy in the cell phone context, but with respect to content
rather than transmission.  In Riley, a police officer seized Riley’s cell phone
upon discovering it in Riley’s pants pocket during a search incident to
arrest.61  The officer then proceeded to access the information contained on
56 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  Under this framework, while a
short-term monitoring of movements may accord with societal expectations of what is rea-
sonable, long-term monitoring would be more likely to impinge on society’s expectations
of privacy. Id. at 964; see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).  It may be the case that at least five Justices (Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg,
Kagan, and Sotomayor) are ready to find that prolonged tracking is a search by endorsing
some version of the D.C. Circuit’s “mosaic theory” of Fourth Amendment protection.  Orin
S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 320–21 (2012); see
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
From Maynard, the D.C. Circuit’s mosaic theory can be used to analyze searches “as a col-
lective sequence of steps rather than as individual steps” to find a Fourth Amendment
violation.  Kerr, supra, at 313.
58 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.
59 Id. at 963–64 (“To date, however, Congress and most States have not enacted stat-
utes regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for law enforcement purposes.  The
best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask
whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a
reasonable person would not have anticipated.”).
60 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  The Supreme Court considered a companion case, United
States v. Wurie, together with Riley v. California, but as they both raise the same legal ques-
tion, they will collectively be referred to in this Note as “Riley.”
61 Id. at 2480.
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the phone and recognized repeated appearances of the letters “CK”—either
in text messages or a contacts list—that the officer believed was short for
“Crip Killers,” a slang term for members of the Bloods gang.62  At the police
station, investigators found photo and video evidence on the phone that
linked Riley to a shooting from a few weeks earlier.63  The prosecutors
sought to enhance Riley’s sentence based on the information obtained from
the cell phone.64
Citing Kentucky v. King,65 the Riley Court explained that “[i]n the
absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific
exception to the warrant requirement.”66  The exception relevant in Riley was
a warrantless search conducted incident to a lawful arrest, which allows a
search of the area under the arrestee’s “immediate control” to protect officer
safety or to prevent destruction of evidence.67  However, the Court recog-
nized that cell phones do not further the same governmental interests—such
as officer safety and evidence destruction—and that cell phones implicate
greater individual privacy interests than physical searches.68  The Court dis-
agreed with the government’s assertion that cell phone data is “materially
indistinguishable” from the information discoverable about a person from
certain physical items, such as purses, wallets, and address books.69 Riley
does not preclude officers from examining the physical aspects of the phone
to ensure nothing on it can be used as a weapon.70  But because the contents
within the phone pose no risk of bodily harm to the officer, inspection of the
contents cannot be justified without a warrant.71  The Court was concerned
with protecting individuals from the inherent qualities of cell phones that
could allow private information to be conveyed “far more than previously
possible.”72
The Court also addressed the government’s concern about evidence
destruction.  The government argued that a defendant may be able to use
encryption or have the information within a cell phone wiped remotely, but
62 Id.
63 Id. at 2480–81.
64 Id. at 2481.
65 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
66 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482.
67 Id. at 2482–83.
68 Id. at 2488.
69 Andrew Serwin et al., Courts Defer to Individual Privacy Interests by Requiring Warrant to
Obtain Cell Phone Data and Cell Site Records in Riley and Davis, BLOOMBERG BNA 2 (July 30,
2014), available at http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/Articles/140730CourtsDefertoIn
dividualPrivacy.pdf.
70 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2478.
71 Id.  Cases where law enforcement is at risk of physical harm are to be left to case-
specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as the exception for exigent circum-
stances. Id. at 2486; see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (“The Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to
do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”).
72 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2479.
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the Court found that both of these methods of information protection were
beyond what an arrestee would be able to achieve upon arrest.73  The Court
further explained that “wiping” can be prevented simply by disconnecting
the phone from the network, either by removing the battery or by placing the
phone in a place that isolates the phone from radio waves.74  Furthermore,
even if law enforcement officers are in a “now or never” situation, they may
still be able to rely on another recognized exception—the exigent circum-
stances exception—in order to search the phone immediately in cases where
remote wiping is imminent.75  The exigent circumstances exception requires
courts to determine whether an emergency situation can justify a warrantless
search in certain cases.76
The Court very briefly mentioned the historic location information that
cell phones also reveal to allow “reconstruct[ion] [of] someone’s specific
movements down to the minute,”77 but it did not address the constitutional-
ity of using 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) to obtain historical cell site location data
from third-party cellphone providers.78  The Court also mentioned in a foot-
note that since the two cases in Riley involved searches incident to arrest, the
Court did not have to reach the question of “whether the collection or
inspection of aggregated digital information amounts to a search under
other circumstances.”79  The Court’s footnote alludes to what Professor Orin
Kerr calls the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment, which asks whether
a collection of acts together amounts to a Fourth Amendment violation as
opposed to an assessment of each step independently.80  Although the
Supreme Court has not yet adopted this approach, if the Court takes up the
issue before Congress defines the boundaries of cell phone privacy with
respect to historical cell site data, the “mosaic theory” may be a way to reach a
just result in a difficult case.81
Finally, the Court acknowledged that although Riley would arguably have
some impact on the law enforcement’s ability to combat crime, the holding
“is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is
instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search.”82  Like in
Jones, Justice Alito once again pointed out in his concurrence that it may be
73 Serwin et al., supra note 69, at 2.
74 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 2494.
77 Id. at 2490.
78 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
79 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 n.1.
80 See Kerr, supra note 57.
81 However, Kerr notes that the “mosaic theory” may have implementation problems
in practice. Id. at 346 (“[T]he theory raises so many novel and puzzling new questions that
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to administer effectively as technology changes.”).
82 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
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time for the legislature to step in in order to balance the privacy interests of
individuals against the needs of law enforcement.83
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF HISTORICAL CELL SITE DATA
A. Third and Fifth Circuit Precedent
For the most part, the caselaw related to historical cell site data has
occurred largely at the district court level,84 but both the Fifth and Third
Circuits have settled the issue within their jurisdictions.85  The Fifth Circuit
has declined to extend Riley’s holding regarding the contents within cell
phones to historical cell site information.86  The Fifth Circuit’s leading prece-
dent is still In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data (In re
Historical Cell Site Data), which held that cell phone holders do not have a
constitutionally protected interest in the location records providers keep.87
Therefore, the In re Historical Cell Site Data court reversed the district court’s
adoption of a magistrate judge’s ruling denying governmental access to his-
torical cell site information.88  In the Fifth Circuit’s view, because cell phone
users know that providers retain historical cell site information and “will turn
it over to the police if they have a court order,” cell phone users have “volun-
tarily” conveyed the cell site data whenever calls are made from their
phones.89  The court assumed that cell phone holders are sophisticated
enough to understand that cell phone providers retain historical cell site data
and will turn it over to law enforcement.  However, it is debatable whether
83 Id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In light of these [modern cell phone] develop-
ments, it would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century were left pri-
marily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment.”).
84 See Anderson, supra note 5.
85 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); In re U.S. for an
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620
F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  The Second Circuit held in 2013 that § 2703(d) was not “clearly
unconstitutional” and therefore allowed evidence obtained by an officer acting in reliance
on the statute to be admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
United States v. McCullough, 523 Fed. App’x 82, 83 (2d Cir. 2013).  Some district courts in
the Second Circuit treat the law in that circuit as supporting the conclusion that orders
issued under § 2703(d) are covered by the good faith exception. See, e.g., United States v.
Mack, No. 3:13-cr-00054, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159686, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2014);
United States v. Serrano, No. 13 Cr. 58, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81478 (S.D.N.Y. June 10,
2014).
86 See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, No. 13-50376, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17584, at
*13 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2014) (“[F]or a Supreme Court decision to change our Circuit’s law,
it must be more than merely illuminating with respect to the case before [the court] and
must unequivocally overrule prior precedent.” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir.
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
88 Id. at 615.
89 Id. at 614.
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the public is actually aware of or has even thought about their cell phone
providers’ practices.90
In re Historical Cell Site Data echoed the Third Circuit’s 2010 decision in
In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communications
Services to Disclose Records to the Government,91 which also reversed an order
declining to provide historical cell site data.92  Although the Third Circuit
has treated historical cell site data similarly to how the Fifth Circuit has in
allowing the “specific and articulable facts” standard to govern the disclosure
of the information, because the magistrate judge asserted that a cell phone
can act like a tracking device to disclose movement and location information,
the court devoted substantial analysis to doubting this assertion.93
There is a general disagreement as to how accurately historical cell site
data can reveal the location of a person carrying a cell phone.  Given the
various applications on smartphones that pull location data, it is plausible
that in conjunction with the regular cell phone tower information, the cell
phone provider could pinpoint the location of a person within several feet if
it wanted to.  But it is not clear that the government has ever actually
received the more precise location information from applications on the
phone through a § 2703 order under the Stored Communications Act.94
Professor Kerr’s sense is that cell providers do not “track every location a
person goes; they only track where the phone was when a communication
90 The public may be more suspicious of cell phone providers in the wake of Edward
Snowden’s 2013 leak of documents regarding top-secret government surveillance pro-
grams.  If the public was not on notice before, it should be now, given the media’s atten-
tion to the leak. See, e.g., Anthea Mitchell, 3 Reasons Americans Fear Government, WALL ST.
CHEAT SHEET (Nov. 15, 2014), http://wallstcheatsheet.com/politics/3-reasons-americans-
are-so-suspicious-of-government-monitoring.html/?a=viewall (“To have true privacy, most
Americans seem to believe they’d need to step back into the dark ages, taking a sword . . .
to their . . . cell phone . . . . That is how the world changed, or at least how perceptions
began to change more rapidly, after former NSA contractor Edward Snowden released his
documents on government surveillance.”); cf. Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and
Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinter
net.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/#.
91 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
92 Serwin et al., supra note 69, at 4 (noting that “[t]he Fifth Circuit’s opinion echoes”
In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t).
93 In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010) (“There is no evidence . . . that
historical [cell site data], even when focused on cell phones that are equipped with GPS,
extends to that realm.”).  Cell site information was believed to only provide a “rough indi-
cation” of a user’s location at the time a call was placed or received, although testimony of
an FBI agent revealed that the records could be used to show the times that a person is
generally in their home based on the lack of switching from one tower to another. Id. at
311–12.
94 Some commentators assert that the state of technology is such that the records dis-
closed may be quite precise. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014)
(“Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can recon-
struct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also
within a particular building.”); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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was made.”95  Whether or not the historical cell site information can be char-
acterized as a “tracking device” is important with respect to application of the
SCA, which authorizes disclosure of “wire or electronic communication.”96
Since historical cell site data is not a form of wire communication, the data
must fall within the “electronic communication” part of the statute.97  How-
ever, because the definition of “electronic communication” excludes from its
reach “any communication from a tracking device,” the government may not
compel disclosure under the SCA if the information conveyed from the
device could be used to determine the movements of cell phone users.98
Although opponents of application of § 2703(d) to historical cell site
data argue that the data can be likened to tracking information99—similar to
the information collected from the GPS that was used to track the defendant
in Jones100—the Fifth and Third Circuits have instead asserted that historical
cell site data is considered a “business record” and therefore must be ana-
lyzed under that line of Supreme Court precedent.101  The court in In re
Historical Cell Site Data reasoned that the location data is a “business record”
because the service provider “collects and stores historical cell site data for its
own business purposes . . . on its network” and the government has never
required that such records be kept.102  Historical cell site data, unlike the
GPS in Jones, does not involve a physical trespass because the information can
be accessed remotely; although like a GPS, it may be able to provide informa-
tion regarding individuals’ locations in private spaces.103
95 Kerr, supra note 7.  The accuracy of cell site data depends partly on the range of the
coverage area of each cell tower, which means that a higher number of towers in an area
will increase precision. See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) Part 2: Geoloca-
tion Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec.,
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 33 (2013) (statement of Cath-
erine Crump, Staff Attorney, ACLU) [hereinafter Electronic Communications Privacy Act Hear-
ing] (“[T]he latest generation of cellular towers now may cover an area as small as a
tunnel, a subway, a specific roadway, a particular floor of a building, or even an individual
home or office.”).
96 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
97 See Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1758.
98 See id.
99 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 5.
100 See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that installing a
GPS tracking device on an individual’s vehicle to monitor the car’s movements constituted
a search under the Fourth Amendment).
101 See, e.g., In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013)
(vacating the district court’s order for treating historical cell site information as tracking
information rather than as a “business record”); see also In re U.S. for an Order Directing a
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 309–10
(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the magistrate judge’s characterization of historical cell site data
as a “tracking device”).
102 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 611–12.
103 But see Kerr, supra note 7 (arguing that cell-site records are not “sufficiently precise”
to detail whether an individual is within a particular space).
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B. Eleventh Circuit Finds Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Cell Site Data
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Davis,104 decided less
than one month before Riley, has been vacated and will be reheard en banc.
Its outcome on rehearing will be important because it might eliminate the
circuit split.  In Davis, the district court admitted historical cell site data that
was obtained without a warrant, but on appeal the Eleventh Circuit panel
questioned prior understandings of Fourth Amendment protection limita-
tions and found that the government’s warrantless gathering violated Davis’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.105  In the panel opinion, Judge David B.
Sentelle106 reasoned that under the “privacy theory” of the Fourth Amend-
ment, an invasion of privacy occurs when the government comes to know
something “private in nature.”107  Such an invasion can occur when the gov-
ernment aggregates and analyzes so much public information that it learns
something that would otherwise be private (i.e., the mosaic theory adopted
in Maynard and alluded to in the Jones concurrence).108  If no aggregation
has occurred, the government can still violate the Fourth Amendment by
learning something specific and private about a person.109  Aggregation
aside, Davis extended Jones because it concluded that “even a single point of
cell site location data is presumptively private.”110  Further, even if the gov-
ernment obtains a type of record that only might reveal something private,
aggregating any amount of information of that type of record is a search that
requires a warrant.111  Even though a physical trespass had not occurred in
Davis, the Eleventh Circuit treated as instructive the Jones “mosaic theory”
analysis from Justice Alito’s concurrence.112  Although a car’s movements
may be publicly observed, information obtained through the long-term mon-
itoring of the vehicle over several weeks can be aggregated, violating an indi-
vidual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.113
The government’s retrieval of Davis’s historical cell site data was a search
because it could be used to find out facts that were “private in nature,” such
as when he was “near the home of a lover” or other places deemed private in
104 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated and en banc reh’g granted, No. 12-12928, 2014
WL 4358411 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
105 See Serwin et al., supra note 69, at 3.
106 Judge Sentelle is a United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia who was
sitting by designation.
107 Kerr, supra note 7 (quoting Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216).
108 Id.
109 Id.  Even though the majority in Jones used the trespass theory to decide the case,
four Justices concurred that the same result could have been reached under the privacy
theory. See Serwin et al., supra note 69, at 3 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
958 (2012)).
110 Serwin et al., supra note 69, at 4.
111 See Kerr, supra note 7.
112 See Serwin et al., supra note 69, at 3.
113 Id.
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nature.114  Under this view, aggregation of historical cell site data has the
potential to reveal more private information than could otherwise be
obtained from retrieving only “pieces of information” about a person’s loca-
tion.115  According to Kerr, Judge Sentelle’s view that aggregating cell cite
records may potentially disclose private facts to find a search is contrary to the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Karo, which stated: “[W]e have
never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute
searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment . . . . It is the exploitation of
technological advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their
mere existence.”116
Interestingly, while the government argued that Jones was distinguishable
and that the Fourth Amendment was not violated because GPS is more precise
than historical cell site data, the argument backfired; the court found this
contrary to the purposes for seeking location evidence at all.117  If historical
cell data could be used to bolster a criminal conviction, then it was not too
imprecise to violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.118
Where does Davis leave courts?  Because it does not require courts to
engage in factual inquiries as to whether a “specific context of where the
phone user was—such as whether on public or private property” will matter
in a given case, the implication of Davis is that a warrant would be necessary
to obtain cell site location data, but not surveillance camera footage—even
where both similarly placed a defendant at the scene of a crime.119  If the
Eleventh Circuit’s en banc opinion upholds the panel decision, then certain
information about a person’s location will be considered inherently private
and therefore not discoverable absent a warrant, even though similar infor-
mation about the person may already be in the public domain.120
The Eleventh Circuit panel is not alone in the battle to find a protect-
able privacy interest in historical cell site data.  A federal magistrate judge in
the Northern District of California struggled with the issue, given a lack of
guidance from the Ninth Circuit and the conflict between the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits.121  The judge requested explanation from the U.S. Attorney’s
Office and the San Francisco federal defender regarding why the govern-
ment believed it did not have to obtain a search warrant to retrieve cell site
records.122  Some states have reacted to the issue since Jones.  Colorado,
114 Kerr, supra note 7 (quoting United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (11th Cir.
2014), vacated and en banc reh’g granted, No. 12-12928, 2014 WL 4358411 (11th Cir. Sept. 4,
2014)).
115 See Serwin et al., supra note 69, at 3.
116 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).
117 See Serwin et al., supra note 69, at 3.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 4.
120 See id.
121 See Hanni Fakhoury, A National Consensus: Cell Phone Location Records Are Private, EFF
(July 29, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/constitutionally-important-con-
sensus-location-privacy.
122 Id.
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Maine, Minnesota, Montana, and Utah have all passed statutes that require
law enforcement to obtain a search warrant before obtaining historical cell
site data information from cell providers.123  In Massachusetts and New
Jersey, the highest state courts have held that their state constitutions require
a warrant for the information.124
However, some federal district courts have expressly denied the persua-
sive authority of the Eleventh Circuit’s Davis decision since it was vacated.
The Northern District of Illinois denied the defendants’ motion to suppress
historical cell site data information that was collected by the government pur-
suant to three § 2703(d) requests.125  In rejecting Davis, the court instead
chose to lean on the Fifth Circuit’s In re Historical Cell Site Data decision to
find that court-ordered cell location data orders fit squarely within the
SCA.126  However, application of the mosaic theory from Justice Alito’s Jones
concurrence may have been appropriate in this case, as the government in
the case received data for a ten-month period.  Ten months of monitored
location data would arguably be considered “long-term” and sufficient to vio-
late a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.127
Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit is considering United States v. Graham,
which was decided in the District of Maryland in 2012 after the Jones deci-
sion.128  Pointing to Jones and other established precedent,129 the district
court relied on the third-party doctrine—much like the Fifth Circuit—to find
that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in historical cell site loca-
tion information, as that information is handed over “voluntarily” to the cell
phone provider.130  Since the information did not belong to the consumer
123 Id.
124 Id.; Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014) (finding an expecta-
tion of privacy in long term movements and holding that the expectation is not diminished
merely because Sprint owned the records); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013) (compar-
ing the Jones concurrences to application of access to historical cell site information and
acknowledging that since Jones was decided under a trespass theory, a warrant was not
required).
125 United States v. Rogers, No. 13-CR-952, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145980 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
9, 2014).
126 Id. at *10–11.
127 Judge Kocaras noted that the Seventh Circuit has not directly spoken on the cell site
information question. See United States v. Thousand, 558 F. App’x 666, 670 (7th Cir.
2014) (“We have yet to address whether . . . cell-tower information that telecommunication
carriers collect is protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
128 United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012) (denying defendant’s
motion to suppress historical cell site location data as evidence).
129 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that “a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third par-
ties”); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976) (holding that a bank’s
financial records for the defendant were not the defendant’s “private papers” but instead
were the “business records of the banks”; defendant could not assert ownership or posses-
sion of those records).
130 Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398 (“[H]istorical cell site location records . . . are not
the ‘private papers’ of the [d]efendants—instead, they are the ‘business records’ of the
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and instead belonged to the telecommunication company, the probable
cause standard of the Fourth Amendment was deemed inappropriate.
Therefore, the court reasoned that the “specific and articulable facts” stan-
dard of the Stored Communications Act governed, and ultimately denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress the information.131  It will be interesting to
see what the Fourth Circuit decides in light of Riley, especially since a district
court case after Riley has also found that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated when the government obtained cell location data
pursuant to a § 2703(d) order.132
III. PROBLEMS SURROUNDING PRIVACY PROTECTION OF
HISTORICAL CELL SITE DATA
A. Do Individuals “Voluntarily Disclose” Historical Cell Site Data?
Should the Eleventh Circuit come to the opposite conclusion in Davis,
the Supreme Court would no longer have a circuit split ripe for resolution.
However, even if the circuit split disappears, the tension behind the privacy
issue surrounding historical cell site data will not.  Although it may be diffi-
cult in practice to apply Justices Sotomayor and Alito’s more flexible reasona-
ble expectation analysis for aggregated information and long-term
monitoring (i.e., the “mosaic theory” analysis), Justice Sotomayor’s point that
the categorical “voluntary” disclosure rule—or third party doctrine—may
need revisiting should not fall on deaf ears.  It does not follow from the sim-
ple choice to own a cell phone that the consumer has accepted that the infor-
mation can be handed over to the government.  As Justice Stewart
recognized in dissent in Smith v. Maryland, “[a] telephone call simply cannot
be made without the use of telephone company property and without pay-
ment to the company for the service.”133  However, when a person purchases
a cell phone, the purchaser is not given the option to tell the provider that it
may not store location information, or even further that the provider may
not release that information to others.134  It would hardly seem just to say
cellular providers.”).  Furthermore, Judge Bennett rejected application of the “mosaic the-
ory” as the majority in Jones did not endorse the theory, even though it was alluded to in
Justice Alito’s concurrence. Id. at 401.
131 Id. at 401 (“The fact of the matter is that in enacting the Stored Communications
Act, Congress passed a law that rejects a warrant requirement for this type of information,
but does require specific and articulable facts to be determined by a judicial officer.”).
132 United States v. Giddins, No. WDQ-14-0116, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140054 (D. Md.
Sept. 30, 2014).
133 Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
134 As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Smith v. Maryland, even if it can be
assumed that people “‘typically know’ that a phone company monitors calls for internal
reasons . . . it does not follow that they expect this information to be made available to the
public in general or the government in particular.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).  The same is true for cell site location data. But see In re U.S.
for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Because a cell phone user
makes a choice to get a phone, to select a particular service provider, and to make a call,
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that Americans must forfeit privacy rights to take advantage of modern tech-
nology.135  Justice Alito argued that individuals may find the “tradeoff” of
privacy for new technology’s convenience “worthwhile,”136 but is it really safe
to assume that society as a whole has come to accept this tradeoff?
Ninety-one percent of respondents to a Pew Research poll indicated that
they believe “consumers have lost control over how personal information is
collected and used by companies.”137  The survey also concluded that “con-
text matters” when it comes to individuals deciding whether to disclose infor-
mation or not.138  But until it can be said with certainty that the public has
“agreed” to lowered privacy expectations for the benefit of the use of better
technology, an outright declaration that information has been “voluntarily”
disclosed to a telecommunication company—and therefore has no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy—should be avoided.
B. The “Specific and Articulable Facts” Standard Needs Reevaluation
Even if the Supreme Court never revisits the voluntary disclosure stan-
dard, as technology improves, court-ordered disclosures under § 2703(d) of
the SCA may not be legal, as the associated cell phone records will essentially
become the equivalent of tracking devices.  Courts currently holding that
probable cause is the appropriate mechanism for governing disclosure of his-
torical cell site data—not the § 2703(d) “specific and articulable facts” stan-
dard of the SCA—concentrate on the breadth of the tracking device
definition of the statute, and note that the device need only “permit track-
ing.”139  The demand by consumers for more data and improved service will
and because he knows that the call conveys cell site information, the provider retains this
information, and the provider will turn it over to the police if they have a court order, he
voluntarily conveys his cell site data each time he makes a call.”).
135 Eric Samuel Heidel, Warrantless GPS Tracking: Who Cares About Vehicle Transponders—
What About Your Cell Phone?, 8 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2013).
136 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  When
considering the amount of information people post about themselves on the Internet for
the public to see, it does seem to suggest that the way people value privacy has changed, or
at least, that individuals’ expectation of privacy has changed with respect to certain audi-
ences and outlets.  Take Facebook, for example.  People post thousands of photos of their
daily lives, but most people also have their privacy settings set to allow only their friends to
view those pictures.  Alyssa Newcomb, Facebook Users Unwittingly Share More Personal Informa-
tion, Study Finds, ABC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/face
book-lead-users-reveal-personal-information-study-finds/story?id=18667855.  For analysis of
the Fourth Amendment’s application to the Internet, see Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth
Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010).
137 Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-
perceptions/#.
138 Id.
139 Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1776 (citing In re Applications of the United States
for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info.
and Historical Cell Site Info., 509 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D. Mass.) (collecting cases), rev’d, 509
F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007)).
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only increase the number of towers in any given area, thereby increasing the
precision with which the government can identify an individual’s exact loca-
tion through historical cell site data.140  However, whether that information
can be used to identify a person’s location within several feet or several hun-
dred feet, it would still arguably appear to fall within the definition of devices
which “permit tracking” if it can give general geographic location specific
enough to allow the evidence to be admissible in a criminal prosecution.141
If the gap between GPS and historical cell data records is truly clos-
ing,142 Congress should not wait until the two are nearly indistinguishable to
replace the “specific and articulable facts” standard with the Fourth Amend-
ment’s probable cause requirement.  As the Court recognized in Riley, the
warrant requirement is “an important working part of our machinery of gov-
ernment” and is not just “an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against
the claims of police efficiency.”143  The SCA’s “specific and articulable facts”
standard, which has been used to authorize retrieval of historical cell site data
in court orders,144 undermines the importance that has historically been
placed on warrants in Fourth Amendment searches.  Warrants are generally
required to search homes and vehicles,145 and it would not be an unreasona-
ble burden in the historical cell site data context either, especially as warrants
have become increasingly simple to retrieve through technological advances.
For example, in Riley, the Supreme Court noted that there are jurisdictions
“where ‘police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads [and]
judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back to officers in less
than 15 minutes.’”146
If additional circuits choose to follow the Fifth and Third Circuits, basic
privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment will be further eroded.  A
person’s location truly is a “facet[ ] of American life that [has] been uniquely
safeguarded from the intrusive interference and observation of govern-
ment.”147  Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit wrote in his dissent in United
States v. Pineda-Moreno148 that in his thirty years on the bench, the courts have
140 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Hearing, supra note 95, at 34.
141 Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1776.
142 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Hearing, supra note 95, at 33 (quoting state-
ment of Professor Matt Blaze at the hearing on the ECPA).
143 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
144 See Anderson, supra note 5.
145 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 112 (2014) (“The Fourth Amendment demon-
strates a strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant and generally
prohibits warrantless searches.” (footnote omitted)).  In order to perform a search without
a warrant, the search must fall within one of the “well-established exceptions” to the war-
rant requirement. Id.
146 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (alteration in original) (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.
Ct. 1552, 1573 (2013)).
147 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Hearing, supra note 95, at 37.
148 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
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“gradually but deliberately reduced the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”149  As technology improves, the public ought to be disturbed by the
idea that its privacy is left to judges relying on precedent involving old tech-
nology and existing laws, such as the SCA, which do not adequately consider
the precision and accuracy that new technology can provide in disclosing a
person’s location.  Furthermore, this issue will continue to be important, as
the trend has been toward a significant increase in the number of court-
ordered releases of cell phone records in recent years.150
The public would also benefit from having clear notice of the standards
across different jurisdictions.  In 2011, thirty-five ACLU affiliates that submit-
ted public records requests with law enforcement groups around the nation
found that standards varied widely for the showing law enforcement had to
make for collecting different types of location information, not just historical
cell phone data.151  Individuals should not have to wonder whether they are
in a jurisdiction that follows something less than a probable cause standard.
Congress should not leave it to courts to attempt to craft novel argu-
ments as to why probable cause is the standard for historical cell site data.
The courts are not fit to draw the boundaries necessary without completely
overhauling Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, while legislatures are capa-
ble of drawing bright lines.152  Though law enforcement would prefer the
lower standard authorized by the SCA, Congress should expressly declare the
historical preference for probable cause and the warrant requirement.  A
probable cause standard for compelling disclosure of historical cell site loca-
tion information will still allow law enforcement to achieve its objectives
while ensuring that Americans’ privacy expectations are maintained in the
cellular context.  Since cell phone data can be used to discover information
about a person that is “private in nature,” such as whether a person is in an
abortion clinic waiting room, attending an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting,
or going to church, and the government cannot know ahead of time whether
historical cell site data will convey this kind of information, requiring proba-
ble cause to obtain a warrant will better avoid that risk.153
149 Id.
150 Palazzolo, supra note 30.  Verizon reported in a letter to Senator Ed Markey that cell
phone record requests to the company have doubled in the past five years. Id.
151 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Hearing, supra note 95, at 35–36.  In an
extreme example, the ACLU found that police in Lincoln, Nebraska are able to obtain
even GPS data without a warrant based on probable cause. Id.
152 Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law, in CONSTITUTION 3.0:
FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 37, 46 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011)
(“[L]egislatures . . . can promulgate bright-line rules concerning information collected
under specific government powers, and they can explain the scope of the limitation and
the contexts in which it is triggered.”).
153 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Hearing, supra note 95, at 39–40.
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C. The Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act
Congress may be able to mitigate privacy concerns with respect to histor-
ical cell site data by passing the Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance (GPS)
Act.154  A bipartisan coalition led by Senator Ron Wyden, Representative
Jason Chaffetz, and Senator Mark Kirk has reintroduced the bill to both
houses of Congress after it was originally introduced in 2011.155  The legisla-
tion would require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before being able to
acquire “geolocation information” from a private company.156  Its scope cov-
ers information created by electronic devices, such as cell phones, laptops,
and GPS navigation systems, which can all be used to “infer information”
regarding the location of an individual.157  The GPS Act also creates criminal
penalties for tracking the movements of an individual without a warrant,
which are equivalent to current illegal wiretapping penalties.158  The GPS
Act would recognize certain exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as
an emergency exception for when a person’s life is in danger, an exception
for parents to monitor their children, and an exception for lost or stolen
electronic devices.159
The GPS Act has garnered support from the ACLU, the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation (EFF), the Digital Liberty Organization, and the Computer
and Communications Industry Association (CCIA), among other groups.160
The goal of the legislation is to give both private citizens and commercial
entities, such as cell phone providers, “clear guidelines” regarding the cir-
cumstances in which geolocation information may be obtained and used.161
After the GPS Act’s reintroduction in January 2015 to the 114th Congress, it
currently awaits consideration by the Senate and House Judiciary Commit-
tees and the House Intelligence Committee.162
154 Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance (“GPS”) Act, RON WYDEN SENATOR FOR OR., http:/
/www.wyden.senate.gov/priorities/gps-act (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) [hereinafter GPS
Act].
155 Id.
156 Id.  “Geolocation information” is defined as “information derived from a device that
is not the content of a communication and ‘could be used to determine or infer informa-
tion regarding the location of the person.’”  Privacy Tracker, The Next Privacy Frontier: Geolo-
cation, IAPP (June 3, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/the-next-privacy-fron
tier-geolocation/.
157 See Privacy Tracker, supra note 156.
158 GPS Act, supra note 154.
159 Id.
160 Press Release, Rep. Jason Chaffetz, Chaffetz Works to Protect Privacy with GPS Act
(Mar. 21, 2013), http://chaffetz.house.gov/press-release/chaffetz-works-protect-privacy-
gps-act.
161 Id.
162 See GPS Act, H.R. 491, 114th Cong. (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/
bill/114th-congress/house-bill/491/text; see also GPS Act, S. 237, 114th Cong. (2015),
available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/237?q={%22search
%22%3A%5B%22\%22GPS+Act\%22%22%5D}.  The legislation was also reintroduced in
the 113th Congress but ultimately never moved forward.
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CONCLUSION
Although the concurrences in Jones suggest that the Supreme Court may
be ready to find that aggregated historical cell site data over a long period
constitutes a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment,163 such a finding
may have problematic implementation consequences in the long run.164
The Supreme Court is not equipped to draw the bright lines needed to
address the nuanced ways in which technology could violate an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, even though some argue that Riley has
provided the “catalyst” for the Supreme Court to decide other Fourth
Amendment technology-related issues.165
Instead, Congress should pass the GPS Act because virtual searches are
quickly replacing physical ones.  Technological advances reveal that the cur-
rent view of the Fourth Amendment is immaterial to most investigations.166
A search involves looking for something; the form the search takes should be
immaterial if it will reveal the same information as a physical search.  The
sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can return to the true privacy protec-
tions the drafters of the Fourth Amendment intended.  Like the contents of a
cell phone, if the government wants to learn the private whereabouts of an




As this Note went to press, the Eleventh Circuit in an en banc opinion
vacated the prior decision in United States v. Davis, holding that probable
cause is not required to retrieve cell phone location data.168  Judge Frank
Hull delivered the majority opinion writing that the stored telephone records
serve compelling governmental interests and “are routinely used to investi-
gate the full gamut of state and federal crimes, including child abductions,
bombings, kidnappings, murders, robberies, sex offenses, and terrorism-
related offenses.”169  The court further noted that Davis had a diminished
expectation of privacy in the phone records owned by MetroPCS and that,
because the records were not his property, the production of those records
did not entail a serious invasion of privacy.170  The en banc court upheld
Quartavius Davis’s conviction under the good-faith exception, which pre-
163 See supra text accompanying notes 54–59.
164 See Kerr, supra note 57, at 346.
165 See Anderson, supra note 5.
166 Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?, in
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, supra note 152, at 11, 19.
167 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
168 United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7385, at *32 (11th Cir.
May 5, 2015).
169 Id. at *51.
170 Id. at *52–53.
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cludes courts from suppressing evidence when law enforcement’s conduct is
based on a good-faith belief that the actions were legal under current law.171
Two judges dissented from the majority opinion on the Fourth Amend-
ment question.172  Judge Beverly B. Martin, writing for the dissent, wrote that
the Fourth Amendment requires the government to get a warrant to retrieve
historical cell site location information and that “[t]he judiciary must not
allow the ubiquity of technology—which threatens to cause greater and
greater intrusions into our private lives—to erode our constitutional
protections.”173
The opinion specifically noted that Davis was not tracked in real-time
and that the records did not pinpoint Davis’s precise location.174  Thus, the
court’s ruling was carefully narrow.  Some commentators suggest that
although Davis was using old cell phone technology without GPS real-time
tracking capability, lower courts may still read the opinion to leave
smartphone users vulnerable to more precise tracking.175  Although the deci-
sion eliminates the circuit split, it does not eliminate the public’s interest in
the issue and the need for a solution that takes account of the realities of
modern technology.
171 Id. at *53.
172 Id. at *94.
173 Id. at *95.
174 Id. at *8–12.
175 Andy Greenberg, Court’s Reversal Leaves Phones Open to Warrantless Tracking, WIRED
(May 5, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/courts-reversal-leaves-phones-
open-warrantless-tracking/ (citing Susan Freiwald, privacy law professor at San Francisco
Law School).
